· POWER AND LIBERTY ·

LEO TOLSTOI

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POWER & LIBERTY

BY

COUNT LEO TOLSTOÏ

TRANSLATED

FROM THE FRENCH

BY

HUNTINGTON SMITH

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE idea of necessity in history, which was marked out by Count Tolstoï in his essay on "Napoleon and the Russian Campaign," is further developed and formally expressed in the following analysis of "Power and Liberty," which, like the other, has not appeared in Russia, and for the text of which I am again indebted to M. Michel Delines. Most historical students at the present day will agree with Count Tolstoï in his assertion that history has occupied itself altogether too much with objective data, and too little with the principles that govern the life of collective humanity. The historical method now in vogue seems to result chiefly from an effort to heap up facts of the most trivial character, and so to render history

an indefinite panorama of all the events that can come within the knowledge of man. The results are not, at least to some of us, either profitable or attractive, — for, in the accumulation of detail, perspective is wholly ignored; the relative importance of events is indistinguishable; there is no central purpose to give the picture the symmetry and meaning we feel that it ought to possess. And so it has come about that the persistent endeavor to reach final causes has reduced the historical field to a mass of unmanageable debris.

In the essay now before us, Count Tolstoï suggests another method, which he confidently believes will ally historical science with the other sciences. He maintains that history must give up the study of causes, which are not and never can be known, and busy itself instead with the discovery of the laws that govern the life of humanity; that is, with the laws of the organization, expansion, and transmigration of peoples. This method reduces

the "great man" to a comparatively commonplace level; but then, as we all know, Count Tolstoï does not believe in great men of the traditional heroic pattern. He has declared elsewhere, in no indefinite terms, that the true aim of life is love to one's fellows, and greatness of the heroic type is plainly inconsistent with that aim.

The question naturally hinges on the problem of free will, and this problem it seems to me that Count Tolstoï has treated in an original and impressive manner. The fact that man feels himself to be free, and yet knows through reason that he is subject to necessity, is made the basis of a bold and trenchant argument. The conclusion is, moreover, thoroughly consistent and thoroughly logical. Man is free in his motives, conditioned in his actions: there is ample room for the moralist to speculate on this point, and, as Count Tolstoï shows, it is compatible with all our received opinions regarding conduct — properly viewed,

it strengthens religion and morality, it does not weaken them.

Perhaps we shall not be far wrong if we see, in the essay on "Power and Liberty" a bearing on the present condition of the people to which the author belongs. The *Nation*, in a thoughtful review of "Napoleon and the Russian Campaign," suggests that some of the obvious exaggerations of that book have a political significance; the opinion is one that may be commended to readers of this later volume. Surely both books have in them the ground-swell of humanity, the aspiration for freedom, and the cry that voices this aspiration is indeed a cry from the depths. Whether we listen sympathetically and try to understand, or whether we turn aside and denounce the plea as idle and vain, will largely depend, I should think, on our sense of justice, and our sense of the essential nobility of manhood; for there are people who know, or may know if they will, the condition of affairs in Russia, and who yet

have the hardihood to ask why, instead of these polemical works, Count Tolstoï does not write novels. It is as if the house of a man who had made a reputation as a singer were burning, those he loved in immediate peril, and the crowd that gathered at his call for assistance should fall idly to wondering why he did not entertain them with a song.

HUNTINGTON SMITH.

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POWER AND LIBERTY.

I.

THE OBJECT OF HISTORY.

THE object of history is to study the life of peoples and of humanity in general. Now to describe the life of humanity, or simply that of a single people, is an undertaking beyond the ability of man. Historians formerly had a very easy way of reconstructing the life of a people. They told about the actions of persons who ruled over a people, and the life of the nation was supposed to be summed up in the lives of these individuals.

To the question, "How is it that heroes were able to make whole peoples conform to their individual wills?" — the historians replied by proclaiming the existence of a di-

vine will which subordinated peoples to the will of a single chosen man. To the question, "What power controlled the individual will of these heroes?" — they responded by declaring that divinity directed the will of the chosen man towards a predestined end.

In this way, all questions were answered by declaring faith in the divine will, and by maintaining that divinity participated directly in human actions.

Theoretically, the new historical school has refuted both theses. It denies the faith of the old historians in the subordination of man to divinity, and the belief that men are led to predestined ends, and it undertakes to examine, not acts of power, but the causes which are productive of power. Nevertheless, after theoretically refuting the ideas of its predecessors, we find the modern historical school following them in practice.

In the place of men clothed with divine power and governed directly by the will of

God, the modern historians give us heroes endowed with supernatural or superhuman talents, and these men of diverse qualities, from monarchs to journalists, are represented as moulding public opinion.

The ancients, — Jews, Greeks, Romans, — regarded the predetermined ordinances of divinity as the motives of all human action. The new historical school discovers such motives in the welfare of different peoples, — French, English, Germans, — and, in the loftiest abstraction, the welfare of the civilized world and of the whole of humanity — the term humanity ordinarily meaning the peoples who occupy our little northwest corner of the continent.

Modern history refutes the old theories without putting any new ideas in their place, and historians who have rejected the hypothesis of the divine right of kings, or the ancient belief in the decrees of the gods, have been obliged by the logic of events to resort to

the same conception of history by asserting that peoples are guided by isolated individuals, and that there is an object toward which humanity is moving.

In the works of all the modern historians, from Gibbon to Buckle, notwithstanding their apparent disagreement and the superficial novelty of their conceptions, we find at bottom the same two old theories from which they have been unable to escape.

In the first place, historians describe the actions of persons who, in their opinion, have guided humanity. One historian finds his heroes only among monarchs, generals, and statesmen ; another historian makes his selections from the orators, men of science, reformers, philosophers, and poets.

In the second place, historians believe they know the end toward which humanity is guided ; but to one historian that end is the greatness of the Romans, the Spaniards, the French, and to another historian it is liberty and equality, or

civilization in the little corner of the globe we call Europe.

In 1789, a revolution began at Paris ; it grew, spread out, and resulted in a movement of peoples from west to east. Several times this movement towards the east met with a counter movement from east to west. In 1812, it reached its final limit, Moscow, and with remarkable similarity there followed an inverse movement from east to west which, like the former, carried with it the peoples of central Europe. This counter movement returned to the departing point of the preceding wave, Paris, and subsided.

During this period of twenty years, many fields remained fallow, houses were burned, the channels of trade were changed, millions of men were ruined, others were enriched, others emigrated, and millions of Christians who professed to love their neighbors met and killed one another.

What is the meaning of all these occur-

rences? What is the origin of all these facts? What was it that forced these men to burn each other's houses and cut each other's throats? What was the moving power in this series of circumstances?

Such are the very simple and very logical questions that arise in the mind of any one who examines the historical movements of this period in the life of humanity.

For the answer to these questions let us look to history whose mission is to teach humanity to know itself.

If history takes the old point of view, it replies, "God, to reward or to punish his people, gave power to Napoleon and guided his will that he might accomplish the divine purpose."

This reply is, at any rate, clear and conclusive. One may or may not believe in the divine mission of Napoleon, but for him who does so believe, the history of our times is intelligible and harmonious.

But the new historical school cannot resort to this explanation, because it does not believe in the old doctrine that divinity directly controls human action. It simply says, "You would know what this movement was, why it took place, what was the force that controlled it? Well, then, listen to me: —

"Louis XIV. was a very proud and a very presumptuous man; he had such and such a mistress, such and such a minister, and he governed France very badly.

"The successors of Louis XIV. were also incompetent, and they governed France more badly still. They also had such and such favorites and such and such mistresses.

"In these times there arose at Paris a group who proclaimed that all men were free and equal. The result of their teachings was that people in France began to cut one another's throats. These men killed the king and many of the nobility.

"At this moment, a man of genius named

Napoleon came to the surface. He was always successful; that is to say, he killed a great many people, because he was a great genius.

"For this reason he set out to kill the Africans, and he killed so many and showed so much ingenuity and cunning in the killing, that when he came back to France he said that everybody must obey him, and everybody did obey him.

"He made himself emperor, and again set out to kill men; this time in Italy, Austria, and Prussia.

"But in Russia, the Emperor Alexander suddenly resolved to reëstablish order in Europe, and he declared war against Napoleon. All at once, in 1807, they became friends. In 1811 they were again at variance, and killed a great many people. Napoleon led six hundred thousand men into Russia, seized Moscow, and then fled from the city.

"The Emperor Alexander, by the advice of

Stein and others, formed a European league against the disturber of peace.

"Those who had been the allies of Napoleon became his enemies, and the coalition marched against the new forces he had got together. The allies entered Paris, forced the emperor to abdicate, and sent him to the Island of Elba, without depriving him of his title, or failing to show him all possible tokens of deference, although both before and after that time he was regarded as a bandit and an outlaw.

"Then began the reign of Louis XVIII., a prince who, up to that time, had been an object of derision to the French, and also to the allies.

"Napoleon shed tears on taking leave of his old guard, abdicated, and went into exile.

"Now, a number of statesmen and diplomatists talked to one another at Vienna, and thereby greatly increased the welfare of several peoples, and diminished the welfare of others. At this moment, Talleyrand succeeded

in getting possession of a certain arm-chair, and in this way moved back the frontiers of France.

"The diplomatists and sovereigns had differences, and they were about to set their armies at work cutting each other's throats, when Napoleon came back to France at the head of a battalion.

"The French, who detested Napoleon, submitted, and the discontented allies once more set out to fight with France.

"Napoleon, the genius, was sent like a bandit to St. Helena. There, in exile, separated from his relatives and from his dear France, he died a lingering death, while telling the story of his life for the benefit of posterity.

"Meanwhile, a reaction took place in Europe, and all the sovereigns began once more to oppress their peoples."

Do not regard this sketch as a parody, or a caricature of the narratives which historians have produced with regard to this epoch. It is, in fact, a mild summary of the contradictory

and baseless assertions to be found in all the books written about the period in question — the *Memoirs*, the *Universal Histories*, the *Histories of Civilization.*

The replies seem strange and even ridiculous to us, because history, as the new school understands it, is like a deaf person who answers questions that no one has asked.

If the object of history is to describe the movements of peoples and of humanity, the first question demanding an answer will be, "What is the force that sets peoples in motion?" If this question is not answered, all that follows is unintelligible.

The new historical school replies that Napoleon was a great genius, that Louis XIV. was very presumptuous, and that such and such a writer had published such and such a work.

These affirmations are perhaps true, and humanity does not dispute them, but they bring us no nearer the solution of the problem in which we are interested.

We might accept this reply as satisfactory if we recognized the direct action of divine power which is self-sufficient and which governs peoples by means of Napoleons, Louis XIV.s, and great writers. But we no longer believe in this manifestation of divine power, and so, before talking to us about Napoleon, Louis XIV., and the great writers, historians must show us the connecting link between these men and the movements of peoples.

If divine power is to be replaced by a new source of action, we must know in what that force consists, for on this particular point the interest of history is concentrated.

The new historical school apparently takes it for granted that this force is known, and that there is no necessity of demonstrating its existence; but he who studies the historical accounts of recent times will not be able to discover in them the new force, and he will doubt whether after all it is wholly clear to the historians themselves.

II.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF HISTORIANS.

WHAT is the force that sets peoples in motion?

Biographical historians and those who write the history of a single nation ascribe this force to the power which is inherent in heroes and emperors.

According to their stories, events are accomplished solely through the will of a Napoleon, an Alexander, or some other personage whose actions they describe in detail.

Their reply to the question, "What is the force that produces events?" is satisfactory only as long as the facts are collected by a single historian.

When historians of different nationalities and divergent opinions undertake to describe the

same event, their conclusions are worthless, for each of them understands the moving cause in a different and often in a contradictory way.

One assures us that the power of Napoleon is the cause of certain events; another finds the origin of events in the power of Alexander; and a third brings forward still another person as the source of action.

Moreover, these historians contradict one another, even when they try to explain the force upon which the power of a given person depends.

Thus Thiers, who is a Bonapartist, declares that the power of Napoleon was due to his virtues and his genius. Lanfrey, who is a republican, affirms, on the contrary, that the power of Napoleon depended on his cunning and his talent for deceiving people.

These historians, by thus denying each other's affirmations, deprive each other of support, and destroy at a single blow their conception of the force which produces events; and the essential question of history remains unanswered.

Those who undertake to describe the life of all the nations, show in their books of universal history how inadequate is the conception of the biographical historians with regard to the force that produces events. They will not admit that this force comes from the power inherent in heroes and emperors, but maintain that it is the resultant of several forces directed in different ways.

In describing a war or the conquest of a nation, the author of a universal history looks for the cause, not in the power of a single person, but in the combined action of several persons who have taken part in the progress of events.

It is plain enough that the power of historical personages, who are themselves subject to certain conditions, ought not to be regarded as the force that in itself brings events to pass. But we find the authors of universal histories having recourse also to the idea of power, which they regard as a

force in itself, and as the cause and producer of events.

In the narratives of these historians we find a certain personage put forth as the product of his time, and his power as the product of different forces, and then this power is regarded as the exclusive force which produces events.

Gervinus, Schlosser, and others, demonstrate that Napoleon is the product of the Revolution, of the ideas of '89, etc., and then they go on to show that the Russian Campaign and other displeasing events are simply the results of Napoleon's misdirected will, and they further demonstrate that the ideas of '89 were checked in their development by the arbitrary power of Bonaparte.

It seems, then, that the Revolution and the life of this whole period produced the power of Napoleon, and that this power stifled the ideas of the Revolution and suppressed the new germs of life.

A contradiction so strange is not accidental. We find it continually arising. All historical narratives are a tissue of similar contradictions.

The result is that those who have undertaken to write universal history have stopped half way.

In order that component forces may give a certain resultant, the sum of the component forces must be equal to the resultant. Historians always forget this law, and to justify the result they are obliged to add to their inadequate component forces an unexplained force which acts upon and through the different elementary known forces.

A biographical historian, describing the campaign of 1813, or the restoration of the Bourbons, declares boldly that all these events were produced by the will of Alexander.

But Gervinus, from the point of view of the universal historian, disputes this idea of the historico-biographer, and attempts to show that the campaign of 1813 and the restoration

of the Bourbons was produced, not alone by the will of Alexander, but by the influence of Stein, of Metternich, of Madame de Staël, of Talleyrand, of Fichte, of Châteaubriand, and of others.

The historian evidently decomposed the power of Alexander into the different factors, Talleyrand, Châteaubriand, Madame de Staël, etc. But the sum of the factors, that is, the influence of Châteaubriand, plus the influence of Talleyrand, plus the influence of Madame de Staël, is not equal to the result, — to the fact that millions of Frenchmen submitted to the Bourbons.

And so the historian, to explain the fact, is obliged to admit once more the power he denies, and with it make up the resultant of his forces. In other words, he is obliged to recognize an inexplicable force which acts upon his elementary forces.

In this manner reason those who write universal history, and they are thereby at variance

with writers of special histories and finally contradict themselves.

Country people who have no idea of the causes of rain, believe that the clouds come and go in order to give them wet or dry weather.

After the same manner we find universal historians supporting their theories, now by arguing that power is the result of events, now by asserting that power produces events.

Those who have undertaken to relate the history of civilization have pursued the road marked out by the universal historians, but they are not satisfied by looking for the force that produces events in certain writers or certain beautiful women, so they seek for it principally in civilization, that is to say, in the intellectual life of peoples.

These historians are entirely consistent with the theory of universal history from which they start. If we can explain historical events by the fact that certain persons had such and such relations with one another, why may we not

explain the same events by the fact that such and such writers published such and such books?

From the innumerable manifestations that accompany every event of life, these historians select one, intellectual activity, and declare it to be the cause of all events.

Yet in spite of their efforts to maintain this theory, we must grant them important concessions before we admit that there is any relation between the movements of peoples and their intellectual life.

It is quite impossible to demonstrate that the intellectual life governs the actions of historical personages, for the theory is set aside when we find events like the horrible massacres, battles, and executions of the French Revolution following arguments in behalf of equality and fraternity.

But even if we grant as true, all the subtle dissertations with which histories of civilization are filled, even if we admit that peoples are

controlled by an indeterminate force called the Idea, the essential question of history still remains unanswered.

In addition to the power of monarchs and the influence of statesmen and great ladies, we now have a new force, the Idea, the relation of which to the masses is not manifest.

We may admit that Napoleon truly possessed power, and that for this reason certain events followed; we may, even, by making further concessions, acknowledge that Napoleon and other influences caused events; but how can we believe that, as a direct consequence of the *Contrat Social*, Frenchmen set to work to cut each other's throats? To believe this, we must see the relation uniting the new force to the event.

Since it is certain that there are relations between all things simultaneously existing, there must be some way of discovering a bond between the intellectual life of men and their historical life, just as we can show rela-

tions between movements of humanity and commerce, industry, agriculture, and anything else.

The difficult point to understand is why the intellectual life of men should be, as the authors of histories of civilization affirm, the cause or expression of the life of humanity.

We can explain the assertion by means of two facts: —

1. History is written by scholars who naturally think the life of their class the basis of the life of humanity in general, just as merchants, farmers, and soldiers like to imagine that *they* are making history; we do not find this point brought out in historical works, because merchants, farmers, and soldiers, do not write history.

2. The intellectual life, education, civilization, the ideal, are so many indeterminate conceptions under which we are able conveniently to arrange words still more vague, and thus adapt them to all possible theories.

Without passing judgment upon their intrinsic value (for it is possible that histories of civilization and universal histories are of some use) we find them to possess one singular characteristic. After seriously analyzing in detail religious, philosophical, and political doctrines as the causes of events, they never fail when they have a historical fact to relate, — the Russian Campaign, for example, — they never fail to describe this fact as a consequence of power; they declare positively that the Russian Campaign was the product of the will of Napoleon.

In this way, historians of civilization contradict one another without knowing it. They prove that the new force they have imagined does not explain historical events, and that the only way of understanding history is by admitting the theory of power which they have attempted to set aside.

III.

THE IDEA OF POWER.

A LOCOMOTIVE is in motion. What makes it go?

The moozhik replies that it is the devil; another says it moves because the wheels go round; a third assures us that the cause of motion is the smoke which the wind bears away.

The moozhik will not give up his opinion without a struggle. He is convinced that his explanation is the most satisfactory and complete to be found. To undeceive him, you must prove to him that the devil does not exist; or another moozhik must explain to him that it is not the devil, but the German engineer, who makes the locomotive go.

It is apparent from all these contradictions, that neither one nor the other can be right.

He who attributes the movements of the locomotive to the fact that the wheels go round is inconsistent with himself, because from the moment that he begins to analyze the movement of the machine, he ought logically to discover the final cause of the motion of the locomotive in the force of the steam imprisoned in the boiler.

He who accounts for the motion of the locomotive by the smoke that the wind blows away, evidently seizes upon the first manifestation that attracts his attention, and denominates it a cause.

The only way in which we can explain the motion of the locomotive is by getting an idea of a force equivalent to the observed movement.

And so the only way of explaining the movement of peoples is by forming a conception of a force equal to the sum of the movements of peoples.

The different forces assigned to meet this law by different historians are not equal to the

movements of peoples. Some of the historians have recourse to heroes, just as the moozhik finds a use for the devil. Others discover force in diplomatic intrigues, and are like the man who explains the motion of the locomotive by the fact that the wheels go round. Others, still, point to the influence of great writers, and resemble him who attributes the motion of the locomotive to the smoke driven away by the wind.

When any one undertakes to write the history of a remarkable person, whether that person is called Cæsar, or Alexander, or Luther, or Voltaire, —and does not include the history of all the men, without a single exception, who took part in the events under discussion, it is impossible not to attribute to the remarkable person a force which obliges other men to direct their activity towards a common end.

Historians conceive of this force in the unique form of power.

The idea of power is the lever by means of

which historians pry up material for history, as we understand history nowadays. He who breaks the lever, as Buckle did, and is unable to obtain another, is incapable of utilizing historical material.

When we see authors of universal histories and histories of civilization renouncing the idea of power, and yet constantly making use of it, we understand the impossibility of explaining historical events without the assistance of some such conception.

The relation between historical knowledge and the questions that preoccupy humanity at the present time, is much like the relation between bank notes and coin.

Biographical histories and the histories of isolated nations resemble bank notes. They may circulate in trade and be of service, but only as far as actual payment is assured.

If we put aside the question as to how the will of heroes brings about events, we find some histories, like that of Thiers, for instance,

to be interesting, instructive, and even animated with a breath of poetry.

But, just as doubt with regard to the value of bank notes arises from the fact that they are easy to make and may increase so fast that they cannot be exchanged for gold, so doubt concerning the value of historical works like that of Thiers arises from the fact that they are numerous and easily produced, and some one is sure to ask, in the simplicity of his heart, "By what force was Napoleon able to do all these things?" Some one there will be who will ask to have his bank notes of poetry exchanged for the pure gold of truth.

Authors of universal histories and of histories of civilization are like men who save their bank notes by paying their face value in debased coin.

Their money has the ring of the genuine metal, but it is not gold.

Now, while spurious bank notes may deceive the ignorant, no one is deceived by spurious coin.

Gold is of value only as a medium of exchange; universal histories will attain specie payment only when they reply to the essential historical question, "What is power?"

Authors of universal histories contradict one another when they reply to this question, and authors of histories of civilization pass it over entirely and reply to questions that were not asked of them at all.

There is no use in making tokens resemble gold, because they pass current only as a conventional sign, or else circulate among those who do not know gold when they see it.

The works of historians who do not respond to the essential questions of history have merely a conventional value; they are accepted by the universities and are in demand among those who are fond of what they call "solid reading."

IV

THE POPULAR WILL.

After thrusting aside the old idea of the submission of the will of a people to the will of a single man chosen by divine will, historical science is unable to take another step without falling into contradictions.

It must choose between two courses. It must either return to the ancient belief that God takes a part in human affairs, or it must clearly determine the meaning of the force which it calls power, and which it says produces historical events.

Faith being destroyed, a return to the ancient belief is impossible at this day ; it is therefore necessary to define the meaning of power.

"Napoleon gave the order for his troops to form and march to the war."

This idea is so natural, so familiar, that we

do not stop to ask why six hundred thousand men should go out and fight at a word from Napoleon. He had the power and consequently his orders were obeyed.

The reply would be satisfactory if we could believe that power was given to him by God. But as we no longer have this belief, we must find out what that power is that one man exercises over his fellow men.

It does not consist in the physical superiority of the strongest over the weakest; the ability, like that of Hercules, to inflict death upon another. It does not consist in moral superiority, although certain simple-minded historians seem to think so when they give us heroes, that is, men endowed with extraordinary strength of soul and intellect.

Power cannot depend upon moral superiority for, without speaking of heroes like Napoleon, whose moral qualities are doubted by many, history shows us that neither Louis XI. nor Metternich was endowed with exceptional

moral qualities, and yet they governed millions of men, while all the time they were morally beneath the least of those whose actions they directed.

If the source of power is not in the physical capacity or moral quality of heroes, we must look for it outside of historical personages in their relations with the masses.

This is the way in which jurisprudence conceives of power.

Power, then, is the united will of the masses, avowedly or tacitly transmitted to rulers chosen by the masses.

In the science of law, which is made up of dissertations on the way in which a state or power is organized, this definition seems clear enough, but when we apply it to history we find that some points are yet to be made intelligible.

Jurisprudence looks upon the state and power as the ancients looked upon fire — as something which exists in itself.

According to history, the state and power are only phenomena, as fire is no longer regarded as a physical element but simply as a phenomenon.

This divergence of opinion enables jurisprudence to show in detail how power ought to be organized, and even to determine power which remains inert outside of time.

But when history asks jurisprudence to explain facts which prove that power is modified in time, jurisprudence is unable to make any reply.

If power is the united will of the masses transmitted to a single person, was Poogatshef, the renegade Cossack, a representative of the will of the masses? and, if not, why did Napoleon I. recognize him as such?

Why was Napoleon III., when arrested at Boulogne, regarded as a criminal, and why, later on, were those who arrested him denounced as guilty?

After a palace revolution, where only two

or three men are engaged, is the will of the masses represented by the new emperor?

In international affairs is the will of the masses carried out by the conqueror?

Was the will of the Confederation of the Rhine incarnated in Napoleon in 1808?

When the Russian troops went with the French troops in 1809, to fight against the Austrians, did Napoleon represent the will of the Russian people?

These questions may be answered in three ways:—

1. We may hold that the will of the masses is transmitted unconditionally to their chosen ruler or rulers, and that any assault upon the power thus established is an attack upon power in itself.

2. We may admit that the will of the masses is transmitted to the ruler or rulers under known and determined conditions, and that all successful attacks upon the power thus established are due to failure on the part of

the rulers to observe the conditions under which they received their power.

3. We may regard the will of the masses as transmitted irrregularly to rulers, under unknown and indeterminate conditions, so that variations in power arise from the fact that rulers fulfil the unknown conditions of power more or less successfully.

In these three ways historians explain the relations existing between the masses and those who govern.

Certain historians (the same biographical historians of whom I spoke a little way back) who are so simple that they do not understand the meaning of power, seem to think that the united will of the masses is transmitted to historical personages without any conditions whatever; and so when these historians describe the power of a given personage they regard it as the only true power, and they look upon all opposing forces, not as power, but as violence, an assault upon power.

This theory may be applied to primitive and peaceable periods of history, but it cannot explain the stormy times in the life of peoples when several powers are in conflict.

A legitimist historian undertakes to prove that the Convention, the Directory, and the Bonapartist government were violations of power; while the republican and the Bonapartist historians try to prove, one, that the Convention, the other, that the Empire, was the only legitimate power, and that all other manifestations were violations of power.

It is plain that such explanations of power mutually invalidate one another; they are good only for children, and for very childish children at that.

Other authors, recognizing the falsity of this conception of history, say that power is based on the conditional transmission of the will of the masses to the rulers, and that these historical personages receive power only on the condition that they carry out the will of the people.

But what are the conditions ? Historians do not tell us, and, when they try to explain, they straightway fall into contradictions.

Every historian establishes his own conditions according to his conception of the object of the life of peoples.

One finds this object to be the greatness, liberty, wealth, and culture of the French people ; another applies the same conditions to the Germans ; a third, to the Russians.

But if we assert that the conditions are the same for all nations, we are obliged to admit that historical facts are nearly always at variance with the theory.

If power is transmitted to rulers on the condition that peoples are assured possession of wealth, liberty, and culture, how is it that Louis XIV. and Ivan the Terrible came peaceably to the end of their reigns, while Louis XVI. and Charles I. were condemned by their peoples and perished on the scaffold ?

Historians reply that the bad government of

Louis XIV. had its effect in the reign of Louis XVI. But why was not Louis XIV. obliged to bear the penalty of his own misdeeds? How was it that the penalty fell only upon Louis XVI.? How much time is needed for the execution of such a penalty?

To these questions we get no reply, because no one can answer them.

There is another phenomenon which historians cannot explain. For several centuries the united will of the masses remained in the keeping of kings and their successors; then, suddenly, in the course of fifty years, it was transmitted to a Convention, from the Convention to the Directory, from the Directory to a person named Napoleon, then to Alexander I., then to Louis XVIII., then back to Napoleon, then to Charles X., then to Louis Philippe, then to a republican government, then to Napoleon III.

To explain this incessant transmission of the will of the masses from one personage to an-

other, especially in international relations, historians are forced to the conclusion that in the course of events the will of the masses is not regularly exerted, and that in many cases the results are due largely to the weakness of diplomatists, monarchs, and party leaders.

Thus historical events, such as civil wars, revolutions, conquests, are represented by historians, not as free transmissions of will, but as will perverted by this or that personage; that is, as a violation of power.

We can see that historical events do not agree with the theory.

These historians are like a botanist who observes that certain plants germinate with two cotyledons, lays this down as a law, and declares that the palm, the mushroom, and the oak, not being dicotyledonous, are exceptions to the rule.

Historians who declare that the will of the masses is transmitted to historical personages under unknown conditions, affirm that these

persons possess power because they carry out the will of the masses so transmitted.

If the force that moves the masses is not inherent in historical personages, but is in the people, what part is to be assigned to these personages by history?

Historians declare that they express the will of the masses, and that their action represents the action of the masses.

We may ask if they express the will of the masses throughout the whole extent of their careers, or only on certain special occasions.

If, as certain historians seem to think, the entire lives of historical personages express the will of the masses, the biographers of Napoleon and Catherine, who describe all the scandals of their courts, reflect also upon the morals of the people.

Is not that a most nonsensical conclusion?

But if the will of peoples is expressed only by certain phases in the careers of historical personages, as the so-called philosophical historians

think, must we not first of all determine what the life of the people is, that we may recognize the special occasions when the career of the hero expresses the will of the masses?

Confronted by these difficulties, historians invent a most vague and intangible abstraction to cover a great number of historical events, and they declare that the object of the life of humanity is to be found in this abstraction.

In the foreground they place liberty, fraternity, culture, progress, civilization. Then they study the lives of the men who have left behind them records of action — kings, ministers, generals, writers, reformers, judges, courtiers — and determine how much these personages have contributed to the realization of the idea evolved by the historians as the supreme object of the life of humanity, or in what manner they have distinguished themselves by fighting against it.

But so far they have not been able to prove that the object of the life of humanity is liberty,

equality, culture, and civilization, or that the relations between the masses and historical personages are based upon the chimerical hypothesis that the united will of the masses is always transmitted to chosen men.

The activity of the life of millions of men who march forth to war, burn their houses, abandon their fields, and cut each other's throats, cannot be expressed by a description of the deeds and words of a dozen persons who never burned their houses, or tilled the soil, or killed their fellows.

History at every step demonstrates the insufficiency of this hypothesis.

Can the revolutions of the peoples of the west at the close of the last century and their movement towards the east be explained by the lives of Louis XIV. and Louis XVI. and their mistresses and ministers, even if we throw in the lives of Napoleon, of Jean Jacques Rousseau, of Voltaire, of Diderot, of Beaumarchais, and of many others?

Can the movement of peoples during the Crusades be explained by the lives of Godfrey of Bouillon, St. Louis, and their knights and ladies?

Can we to this day understand the origin of the movement of peoples which with no apparent reason threw a horde of vagabonds towards the east with Peter the Hermit at their head?

Is it not still more inexplicable to find this movement checked at the very moment when a sacred object, the deliverance of Jerusalem, was suggested?

Popes, kings, and chevaliers besought their peoples in vain to go forth and conquer the holy land; the peoples were deaf because the unknown cause that had pushed them towards the east had disappeared.

The life of Godfrey of Bouillon and the minnesingers cannot express the life of the peoples. Each has his special history, and the life and aspirations of the peoples remain unknown.

Much less shall we find the life of the peoples in the biographies of writers and reformers.

The history of civilization reveals certain conditions of existence, and gives us the thoughts of this writer or that reformer. It tells us that Luther had a fiery disposition and that Rousseau was suspicious by nature, but it does not explain why after the Reformation people cut each other's throats or why the French during the great Revolution hurried one another to the guillotine.

When we put together the two conceptions of history invented by contemporary historians, we obtain biographies of monarchs and writers, never the history of the life of the peoples.

V.

AN UNTENABLE THEORY.

The life of peoples cannot be summarized in the lives of a few individuals, for the bond uniting such persons to peoples never has been discovered. The theory which pretends to find a bond of union in the will of the masses transmitted to chosen historical personages, is not confirmed by the facts.

At first glance, to be sure, the theory seems to be irrefutable, because the act of voluntary transmission cannot be verified.

Whatever the event may be, and whoever may be the personage at the head of affairs, we can always use the hypothesis of transmitted will, and say that the person in question is in his place for the reason that in him is incarnated the will of the masses.

When we apply this theory to historical questions we are like a man watching a herd of cattle, and attributing their change of direction, not to the varying quality of the feed, or the whip of the drover, but to the movements of the animals at the head of the herd.

"The herd," we hear him say, "go in that direction because the leader chooses to have them go there, and the united will of all the other animals is concentrated upon their guide."

This agrees with the theory of that class of historians who believe in the unlimited transmission of the popular will.

"If the animals moving at the head of the herd change their direction, it is because the will of all the animals is transmitted from one to another till a leader is found to conduct them whither they would go."

This is the way events are explained by a second class of historians, who hold that the

united will of the masses is transmitted to rulers under certain conditions which these historians profess to understand.

"If the animals at the head of the herd change their course, and if their course constantly varies, it is because all the animals transmit their will to the leaders, that they may attain certain specified ends. For this reason we must study the movements of the remarkable animals under whose influence the herd is led from side to side."

In this way argue a third class of historians, who believe that historical personages, from monarchs to journalists, are the exponents of a historical epoch.

We see, therefore, that the theory about the will of the masses being transmitted to historical personages is merely a periphrase.

What is the cause of historical events? Power.

What is power? Power is the united will of the masses transmitted to a given personage.

Under what condition is the will of the masses transmitted to a given person? On the condition that the person in question expresses the will of the masses.

That is to say, power is power. Power is a word, the meaning of which we are entirely unable to understand.

VI.

THE CONDITIONS OF POWER.

If abstract reasoning could be made to comprehend all human experience, humanity would examine the idea of power as science formulates it, and conclude that it is only an abstraction, and that in reality it does not exist at all.

Man, however, studies events in the light of experience, and in forming his conclusions is governed by reason, and experience teaches him that power is no vain abstraction, but a real thing.

Whenever a historical event comes to pass, one or several men are at the top, and seem to be the prime agents of transformation.

Napoleon III. gives his orders, and the French start for Mexico.

The King of Prussia and Bismarck make known their wishes, and the German troops enter Bohemia.

At the command of Alexander I., the French submit to the Bourbons.

Experience shows us that in whatever way an event may come to pass it is always related in some way to certain persons who give the necessary commands.

Historians who follow the traditional method and believe in the direct participation of the divinity in human affairs, find the cause of an event in the expressed will of the person who has the power, but this conclusion is not confirmed either by reason or by experience.

Reason shows us that the expressed will of a historical personage — his words — forms but a part of the general activity that leads up to such and such an event, say a war or a revolution.

And so, if we do not recognize the existence of a supernatural or miraculous force, we can-

not possibly think that the words of any person will result in the movement of millions of men.

If we do admit that words can be the cause of an event, history teaches us that on many occasions the will of historical personages has been expressed without any effect whatever, their orders disobeyed, and events brought to pass in direct opposition to their wishes.

Unless we believe that divinity has a part in human affairs, we cannot regard power as the cause of historical events.

Power, as experience teaches us, is simply the relation that exists between the expressed will of a historical personage and the accomplishment of that will by others.

To understand the conditions under which this relation exists, we must first of all recognize the idea of will with reference to man, and not with reference to divinity.

If God gives commands expressive of his will, as the ancients believed, the expression of

his will is not subject to time or any determining cause, but is wholly independent of the event.

When, however, we speak of human commands as the expression of the will of men who are subject to the limitations of time and are dependent upon one another, we must understand the two conditions under which all historical events are produced, that we may know the relation existing between decrees and the events that follow. These conditions are:

1. Continuity in time between the historical movement and the person who gives the command.

2. An alliance between the historical personage who gives the command, and the men who carry it out.

VII.

RELATION OF COMMANDS TO EVENTS.

SINCE man acts in time and has himself a part in events, only the expression of the divine will, which is independent of time, can be related to a series of events extending over a period of years or centuries ; and only divinity, which is superior to all influences, can determine by will alone the character and the direction of the movement of humanity.

If we recognize the first condition, that an event must be accomplished in time, we see how impossible it is that a command should be executed, unless it is preceded by another command to facilitate its accomplishment.

A command is never a spontaneous utterance and it never can be related to a series of events. Every command is the result of

some other command, and is related to the event only at the moment when it is fulfilled.

When, for instance, we say that Napoleon gave the order for his troops to go to war, we sum up in a single command a series of consecutive commands, all dependent upon one another.

Napoleon did not command the Russian Campaign to take place; it was beyond his ability to do so.

On a certain day he ordered such and such messages to be sent to Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg; the next day he despatched orders to the fleet, the army, the commissariat; and so on. His commands resulted in millions of orders which corresponded to the series of events that led the French army into Russia.

Throughout his whole reign, Napoleon was constantly planning an expedition against England, but, although he bestowed more attention upon it than upon any other enter-

prise, his plan never was carried out. Moreover, he resolutely entered upon the Russian Campaign after having many times declared that he would prefer Russia as an ally.

His commands with regard to England had no relation whatever to events; with regard to Russia, commands and events were in harmony.

If a man would have his orders carried out, he must give orders that can be accomplished.

To distinguish between what can be accomplished and what cannot be accomplished is impossible, not only in an event of importance, like the Russian Campaign, but under any circumstances, for all historical action is accomplished in the face of many difficulties.

For every order that is carried out, a great many orders are not accomplished at all.

Only the orders that can be accomplished form a consecutive series corresponding to the series of events.

Our error in taking the order that precedes

an event for the cause of that event, arises from the fact that, when an event occurs, out of thousands of orders given only those corresponding to events are accomplished, and we forget those that are not accomplished and are incapable of accomplishment.

Another and the principal source of error is, that in historical narratives we find a whole series of ideas, and facts innumerable (as, for example, those which corresponded to the movement of the French armies into Russia), summed up in a single event which gives the result produced by a series of actions.

We generalize, and take a series of orders as the sole expression of the will of one man.

We say, "Napoleon wanted the Russian Campaign, and he brought it to pass."

Now the fact is, we cannot find, in the recorded life of Napoleon, the expression of any such desire.

We find simply a series of conflicting and indeterminate orders or expressions of will.

Out of an innumerable series of orders, some were accomplished and the result was the Russian Campaign. These orders were accomplished, not because they differed from those that were not accomplished, but because they corresponded to the events that led the French army into Russia.

So the fresco painter spreads his colors at haphazard upon his stencil, and without special effort produces the predetermined design.

When we analyze the relation between orders and events in time, we find that the given command is never the cause of the historical fact, but that the two have a certain connection.

To know what this connection is, we must remember another condition upon which all human orders are dependent. The person who gives the command must himself take part in the event.

The relation that subsists between the man who gives the orders and the men who receive

the orders, is what we mean when we speak of power.

That they may exert a common action, men unite into groups, and in these groups, in spite of the diversity of aims, the relations between the component parts are always identical.

When men are united into groups, the majority take a direct part in the common action, and so form another group, while the minority have little or no direct connection with affairs.

Of all the groups formed by men for purposes of common action, the most important and the best organized is the army.

Every army is composed of soldiers, who form the majority, then of corporals, then various minor officers, then colonels, then generals, etc., — the number of each class diminishing as we ascend the military hierarchy, till we find supreme power concentrated in a single man.

The organization of an army may be likened to a cone. The base, where the diameter is largest, is composed of soldiers; the successive

sections are officers of superior rank; and at the summit of the cone sits the commander-in-chief.

The soldiers, who are by far the most numerous and who form the lowermost portion of the cone, take a direct part in events; they kill, they burn, they pillage, and all the time they receive orders from their superiors and never give any orders themselves.

The subalterns are less numerous and they participate less actively in what is going on, but they give orders.

The officer of a higher rank does still less, but he gives more frequent orders.

The general gives orders to the troops and tells them where to go; he never fires a shot himself.

The commander-in-chief takes no part in action, but issues general orders for the movement of masses of troops.

The same relations exist between men who are united for any common action, whether

the end in view be industry, or commerce, or any other enterprise.

When we examine an organized group and follow the different grades from the base to the apex of the cone, we find it to be a law that the more actively men participate in affairs the fewer orders they are able to give, and that the more orders they give the less are their numbers, until we come to a single man who takes no part whatever in events, and who has nothing to do but to give orders.

The relations between the men who give the orders and the men who receive them, is the essence of the idea which we call power.

In examining the conditions of time under which events take place, we have found that an order is accomplished only when it is related to a corresponding series of events.

On looking into the relations that subsist between the men who command and those who

receive orders, we have seen that, in accordance with their respective situations, those who give the most orders take the least part in the event, and that their action is limited exclusively to giving orders.

VIII.

RELATION OF COMMANDS TO POWER.

When an event is in progress every one has an opinion and a desire with regard to its consummation, and as the event is the result of the combined action of millions of men it is natural that one of the opinions or desires should be realized. Then the opinion or desire thus realized appears to us like a command which preceded the event.

Several men join their forces to carry a stick of timber. They ask each other where it is to be placed, and each one of them has his idea of the proper destination. When the task is accomplished, they find that they have followed the advice of one of their number. He is the one who gave the command.

Such, in its most primitive form, is the relation of command and power.

The workman who toils uninterruptedly with his own hands has no time to think about what he is doing, or to foresee the result of combined action. It is impossible for him to give orders.

He who gives the orders is more occupied with talk than with action, and therefore evidently works less with his hands.

The larger the association formed for labor in common, the more important becomes the class of men who give orders and do not work.

A man working alone believes himself to be governed by a series of associated ideas which have directed his former labors, which facilitate the work of the moment, and which will be useful to him in future enterprises.

Men who unite in large numbers to work together at a common task, leave to those who take no part in action the responsibility of inventing and combining the results of their common action, and of justifying the action after it is completed.

At the close of the last century for causes, some of which are known, and some of which are not known, the French set to work to cut each other's throats.

People try to justify the event by declaring that it is essential to the welfare of France and the triumph of the ideas of liberty and equality.

The French stop killing one another, and people justify their course by saying that power must be consolidated to resist invasion.

The French rush from west to east and kill a good many of their fellow-men, and the cause of this event is the glory of France and the humiliation of England.

History proves these explanations of the facts to be nonsensical, shows that they are mutually contradictory, and refuses to uphold the theory that men must be killed to establish the rights of man, or that Russians must be slaughtered for the humiliation of England.

But these explanations are necessary at the

moment they are made; that is, immediately after the events to which they apply.

They relieve the men who have brought about the events from all moral responsibility.

The imaginary object bears the same relation to the event that a cowcatcher does to a locomotive; it clears the road of moral responsibility.

If we did not have these explanations, we could not possibly understand how millions of men could commit collective crimes, such as massacres and wars.

Can we, in the complex forms of the political and social life of modern Europe, find any event that has not been advised, predicted, or commanded by kings, ministers, parliaments, and newspapers?

Is there any collective event, whatever, that we cannot justify by speaking of national unity, the European balance of power, or civilization?

And as any event, whatever, indubitably cor-

responds with the expressed wish of some one, and so receives its justification, it seems to us to be the result of the will of a single personage, or of a few chosen men.

A ship in motion, whatever may be its course, always has a current of water to overcome. Any one looking over the side would think the water and not the ship was in motion.

But when the observer has carefully watched the apparent movement of the water and discovered that it corresponds exactly with the motion of the ship, he sees that he has fallen into error by not in the first place taking into account the progress made by the vessel.

We make the same discovery when we examine the action of historical personages and bear in mind their relation to the masses.

While a vessel is moving in a given direction it has always before it the same current of water; when it changes its course, the course of the current changes; whichever way it goes, it has always a current against it to overcome.

Whatever the event, we find that it has always been predicted and ordained.

In whatever direction the ship moves, the water boils up at the prow, and, to an observer at a distance, seems itself to move and at the same time to guide the movement of the vessel.

IX.

THE ULTIMATE LIMIT OF THOUGHT.

HISTORIANS who take the expressed will of historical personages as orders corresponding to events, believe that the events depend upon the orders.

But when we analyze the events themselves and their relations to the masses, we find that historical personages as well as the masses are dependent on events.

Innumerable orders may be given, and yet the event will not take place if the causes that render it possible do not exist. On the other hand, out of the many orders given by historical personages, there will always be some which in time and purport will coincide with events and be considered as causes.

When we have reached this conclusion we

can give a positive reply to the two essential questions of history:

1. What is power?

2. What is the force that puts peoples in motion?

Power is a relation established between a certain person and other men, by virtue of which this person's part in action is inversely proportioned to the number of orders he can give before the event, and the number of reasons he can find after the event to justify the common activity.

Peoples are not put in motion by power, or by the ideas of writers, or by a combination of the causes in which historians believe, but by the action of *all* the men who take part in the event and who group themselves in such a way that those who are concerned most directly in events have the least responsibility.

In the moral relation, power is regarded as the cause of the event; in the physical relation, those who obey power are regarded as the

cause of the event ; — but, as moral activity is not possible without physical activity, the cause of the event is not wholly in power or in the men who submit to power, — it is in the union of both. That is to say, the idea of causality is not applicable to the phenomenon under consideration.

In the last analysis we come to a full circle, to infinity, to that ultimate limit of human thought which hedges in every theme to which we give serious attention.

Electricity produces heat; heat produces electricity. Atoms attract; atoms repel. When we speak of the phenomena of heat, of electricity, of atomic relations, we cannot explain why these phenomena take place. We can only say that such is the nature of these phenomena in accordance with physical law.

The same conclusion applies to historical events. Why did such and such a war take place? What was the cause of such and such a revolution? We do not know. We can only

say that, to bring about the event in question, men grouped themselves in a certain way and all took part in action; such, we say, is the nature of men, and such the law that governs them.

X.

THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL.

If history were concerned with physical phenomena, we might formulate anew the simple and evident law established in the preceding chapter, and our task would be at an end.

The historical law has to do with man.

An atom of matter cannot tell us that it is unconscious of the necessity of attracting or repelling other atoms, and that our law is not true.

But when we apply the law to man, the object of history, he is ready with a definite reply.

"I am free," he says, "and for that reason I am not subject to any law."

The problem of free will meets us at every step in history. It attracts the consideration

of all serious historians. All the contradictions, all the obscure points in history, are occasioned by the difficulty of solving a question that has often turned history aside from the path it ought to pursue.

If every man were free, that is to say, if each could act according to his own desires, history would be simply a succession of accidents with no common bond.

If among millions of human beings, in a period of a thousand years, we could find a single man who was capable of acting purely in conformity with his own desires, the free action of this man in opposition to the general law would be enough to annul the possibility of historical laws for all humanity.

But if there be a historical law governing the actions of men, free will cannot exist, for the will of men would be necessarily subject to this law.

Here we have the problem of free will; it occupied the attention of the great thinkers of

the past, and its meaning and importance were recognized from the earliest times.

The problem may be summed up in this way: —

If we regard man as an object of study, whether from the theological, or historical, or ethical, or philosophical point of view, we find that he, like everything else that exists, is subject to the law of necessity. But if we regard mankind subjectively, as something of which we have consciousness, we believe him to be free.

This perception of being is the source of consciousness of self, which is entirely independent of reason.

By reason, man analyzes himself, but he knows himself only through self-consciousness.

Without consciousness of self, observation and reason would be impossible.

To understand, observe, and reason, man must first of all be conscious of his own existence.

Man is conscious of his existence only when he feels that he has the power of desire, when he knows his own will.

Will, which is the essence of his life, man must conceive of as free, because he cannot conceive of it in any other way.

But when man selects himself as an object of study, and observes the necessity of taking food or examines the phenomena of cerebral activity, he finds that his will is governed by an invariable law, and this law he must recognize as a limitation of his will.

Now what is not free must be limited. The will of man seems to him to be limited because he cannot conceive of it as free.

You tell me that I am not free, and my only reply is to raise my arm and let it fall.

Every one will see that this illogical reply is an irrefutable proof of my liberty. It is the expression of a consciousness of self not subject to reason.

If consciousness of freedom were not a

source of consciousness of a self isolated and independent of reason, it would submit to reason and experience; but in reality this submission does not exist, and cannot even be conceived as existing.

Experience and reason prove to every human being that as far as he is an object of observation he is subject to laws, and man accepts these laws. He never struggles against the law of gravitation or the law of impenetrability, when he has once recognized their existence.

But experience and reason also teach man that the complete freedom of self he imagines is impossible, that each one of his acts depends upon his organization, his temperament, and other influences; and yet man will not agree to these deductions.

When experience and reason have proved to man that a stone always falls to the earth, he regards the law as infallible, and always expects it to be accomplished.

But when he is taught in the same way that

his will is subject to laws, he does not believe it and cannot believe it.

Experience and reason may prove to man, time and time again, that under the same conditions and with the same temperament, he always will act in the same way, but when for the thousandth time he begins to act under the specified conditions with temperament unchanged, he is just as sure as he was in the first place, that he has the power to act in accordance with his own will.

Every man, whether he be a philosopher or a savage, may know by experience and reason that there cannot possibly be two different actions under precisely the same conditions, and yet if he did not believe in the absurd possibility (which is the essence of free will) he would believe life itself to be impossible.

Although it seems to be impossible, he feels sure that it is true, for if he cannot have free will he cannot understand life, and he cannot live a single instant.

All the aspirations of men, all their reasons for living, tend in reality to augment their freedom of action.

Riches and poverty, fame and obscurity, power and subjection, strength and weakness, health and disease, knowledge and ignorance, toil and pleasure, feasting and hunger, virtue and vice, are only so many varying degrees of liberty.

We cannot possibly imagine a living man deprived of his free will.

If, when examined in the light of reason, the idea of free will appears to be a contradiction and an absurdity, a possibility of accomplishing two different acts under the same conditions or of performing an action without a cause, we simply must conclude that the consciousness of free will does not come under the dominion of reason at all.

When we consider the consciousness of a free, immutable, and supreme will, subject neither to experience nor reason, acknowl-

edged by all thinkers and known to all men, necessary even to their existence, we must look at the question in another way.

As theology puts the problem, man was created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and infinitely good Being, and the question is, What was the sin that gave rise to the consciousness of free will?

According to jurisprudence, the actions of men are subject to general laws discoverable by statistics, and the question is, What is man's responsibility to society because of his consciousness of free will?

According to ethics, man is dependent upon his natural temperament and the influences with which he is surrounded, and the question is, What is the faculty developed by consciousness of free will, which enables man to distinguish between good and evil?

According to history, man, relatively to the life of humanity, seems to be subject to laws that govern the historical life, but outside of

this relation he seems to be a free being, and the question is, Must the historical life of peoples, of humanity, be considered as the product of the free or of the involuntary acts of men?

But nowadays man is sure of everything, thanks to the vulgarization of science by that great instrument of ignorance, the diffusion of literature, and the question has been taken into a field where it cannot be considered at all.

Nowadays, most of the men who call themselves advanced (that is to say, a mob of ignoramuses) accept the views of the naturalists who look at the question only in one way, and whose conclusions are taken as the complete solution of the problem.

"There is no soul," they assure us, "there is no free will, because the life of man is expressed by muscular movements, and these muscular movements are produced by nervous action; there is no soul, there is no free will, because we are descended from apes."

This is spoken, written, and printed by men who call themselves advanced, and who do not even dream that for thousands of years all religions and all thinkers have not only recognized, but have never attempted to deny the law of necessity which our contemporaries take so much trouble to prove, with the aid of physiological facts and comparative zoölogy.

They do not see that as regards this question, natural science is only a means of clearing up one side of the problem.

The fact, that from the experimental point of view, reason and will are only secretions of the brain, and that man, conformably to a general and inevitable law, has been developed from inferior organisms in an indeterminate period of time, is a fact simply serving to throw one more ray of light upon the truth which has been recognized for thousands of years by all religions and all philosophies, that man is subject to the law of necessity.

This fact, however, does not advance the solution of the problem by a single step. The problem has another side, depending on the consciousness of liberty.

Whether man descended from the ape in an indeterminate period of time, or whether he was made from a handful of clay, in a determined period of time, it amounts to the same thing in the end; for, in the first place, we have $x =$ time, in the second place, $x =$ descent.

But the question as to how man's consciousness of liberty can be reconciled with the law of necessity to which man is subject, is a question that cannot be solved by physiology or by comparative zoölogy, for we cannot observe the neuro-muscular activity of the frog, the rabbit, or the ape, while we can observe consciousness united with this activity in man.

The naturalists and their disciples, who think they have solved the question, may be likened to a group of masons commissioned to rough-

cast the outer walls of a church, and who, in their zeal, take advantage of the absence of the overseer to put a coat of plaster over the windows, the sacred images, the inner walls, and the loose stonework, and then are delighted, from their artisan point of view, that they have succeeded in giving the whole edifice so neat and uniform an appearance.

XI.

RELATION OF LIBERTY TO NECESSITY.

In solving the question of free will and necessity, history has a great advantage over other sciences that have attacked the problem, because history does not attempt to discover the essence of human will; it simply follows the manifestations of will in the past, and under known conditions.

As far as the solution of this problem is concerned, history is an experimental science, and the other sciences are abstract sciences.

The object of history is not the will of man, but the idea we form with regard to that will.

History does not, like theology, or ethics, or philosophy, attempt to solve the unsolvable mystery of the reconciliation of free will with the law of necessity. History studies the life

of man, in whom the reconciliation has already taken place.

Every historical event and every human action may be examined by itself, and no contradictions will be noticed, and at the same time each event may be regarded as being in part the result of a free action, and in part as being subject to the law of necessity.

In solving the problem of the reconciliation of free will with the law of necessity, and in understanding what these two ideas really mean, the philosophy of history is able to pursue a path directly opposite to that followed by the other sciences.

Instead of trying to determine the ideas of free will and necessity by subjecting the phenomena of life to ready-made definitions, history looks for the determination of those ideas in the historical phenomena that come within its jurisdiction, and which are always dependent on the laws of free will and necessity.

Whatever idea we may form of the act of one

man, or of many men, we never can conceive of it otherwise than as being in part the product of free will, and in part as being the product of the law of necessity.

When we speak of the transmigration of peoples, the barbarian invasion, of events in the reign of Napoleon III., or simply of any act performed by any man at any moment — as, for instance, chosing one route rather than another for a promenade — we discover no contradiction; the proportion of liberty and necessity involved in these actions is easily recognized.

Our idea of the greater or less part played by liberty in any given act often varies according to the point of view from which we examine the phenomenon, but every human act is invariably seen to be a reconciliation between liberty and necessity.

In every act we find a certain amount of liberty and a certain amount of necessity.

The greater the amount of liberty, the less the amount of necessity, and inversely.

The proportion of liberty and necessity diminishes or increases according to the point of view from which the act is examined, but the two are always inversely related.

A drowning man who clutches another and drags him down to death, a starving mother who steals food that her child may have nourishment, a soldier in the ranks, trained to respect discipline, who kills an unarmed man at the order of a superior, — are all less guilty, that is less free and more subject to the law of necessity, the more clearly we understand the conditions under which they acted; they are more guilty, that is more free, the more firmly we believe that the man who dragged the other down was not drowning, that the mother was not starving, and that the soldier was not in the ranks.

So a man who, after committing a murder, has for twenty years led a peaceful life in the midst of society, will seem to one who judges of the crime after this lapse of time to have

been much more under the control of necessity than the same man would seem to be to one who learned of the crime immediately after it took place.

The act of an insane person, of a drunkard, of a fanatic, seems to be less free and more obedient to necessity to one who knows the conditions, and more free, less obedient to necessity, to one ignorant of the facts.

In every case, the idea of liberty increases or diminishes according to the point of view from which the act is examined. The greater appears to be the necessity, the less will be the liberty, and vice versa.

Religion, human reason, the science of law, and history, comprehend all the relations that exist between necessity and liberty.

XII.

SPACE, TIME, AND CAUSALITY.

EVERY case, without exception, in which our idea of liberty increases or diminishes, may be reduced to three terms :

1. The relation of the man who performed the act to the external world.

2. The relation of the man to time.

3. The relation of the man to the causes that made the act possible.

The first relation, that of the man to the external world, is the more or less definite idea we form of the position the man occupies in regard to what exists simultaneously with him.

Because of this relation, we understand clearly that a drowning man is less free, is more subject to the law of necessity, than is his comrade who remains safely on the shore ;

because of this relation we see that men who live in the midst of a complex society, or who have a family, or who are engaged in any enterprise, are less free and more subject to the law of necessity than an isolated man living in solitude.

If we take a man away from his relations to his surroundings we find that all his acts are free.

But if we observe the most insignificant relations between him and the objects that surround him, if we see him speak to any one, or take a book, or work at any task, if we remember that the air envelops his body and that the sun shines upon him — we shall find that every one of these conditions has a certain influence upon his life, and governs certain phases of his activity.

Our idea of his liberty will be diminished, and our idea of his subjection to necessity will be increased in proportion as we discern these influences.

The second relation, that of man to the external world in time, is dependent upon the more or less definite idea we form with regard to man's position in time.

Because of this relation, the fall of the first man — which was the origin of the human race — was evidently less free than a similar action would be in our own day.

Because of this relation, the lives and the actions of men who existed centuries before our era, cannot seem to us to be as free as the lives and actions of our contemporaries, whose careers are not yet fully known to us.

The idea we form with regard to liberty or necessity under this relation will depend upon the greater or smaller lapse of time between the accomplishment of the act, and the moment when we pronounce judgment.

If I analyze an act which I have just committed, being still surrounded by the same conditions, it seems to me that the act is free.

But if I judge of an action performed by me

a month ago, and I am now in other conditions, it will seem to me that, if I had abstained from the action, many agreeable, useful, and even necessary things would not have taken place.

The further back I go in memory, and the longer the time that has elapsed between an action and my judgment of it, the more doubtful I am with regard to my liberty.

History discovers the same rule when it examines the free will of man in the life of humanity.

An historical act which has just been accomplished seems to us to be the undoubted result of the action of all the men who have taken part in it, but if the event is in the past we see at the same time its inevitable consequences.

The further back we go in history the less the event seems to have been free.

The war between Prussia and Austria seems to us to have been caused by the intrigues of Bismarck.

The wars of Napoleon I. have long seemed

to be the result of heroic will, although we begin now to have a little doubt on that point.

But in the Crusades we have an event which holds a prominent place in the history of modern Europe, an event without which this period of history would never be intelligible; and yet to contemporary chroniclers the Crusades were brought about by the will of certain personages.

When we examine the transmigration of peoples, we do not find any one now asserting that the will of Attila was the means of regenerating an old and dying world.

The further back we go in history, the more doubtful the liberty of men seems to us to be, and the more fully are we persuaded that the law of necessity alone is true.

The third relation is that of cause and effect, the relation exacted by reason in all phenomena, and which demands that every event, every human act, shall have its distinct place

as the result of what went before and the source of what is to follow.

Because of this relation, our personal acts and those of other men seem to us, on the one hand, to be less free and more necessary the better we know the physiological, psychological, and historical laws to which man is subject, and the more fully we have grasped the physiological, psychological, and historical causes of those acts; and, on the other hand, the acts seem to be more free and less necessary in proportion to the simplicity of the action, and the complexity of the mind and character of the man or men whom we judge.

The more ignorant we are of the cause of any act, whether it be a crime or a display of heroism, the more confident we are that the act was free.

If it is a crime, we demand the extreme penalty; if it is a display of heroism, our admiration is unbounded. If the act is peculiar, we assume that it is the indication of an unusual and original personality.

But if, of the thousands of causes which have produced an act, we know even one, we are ready to grant something to the law of fatality. If the act is a crime, we ask that punishment be mitigated; if a display of heroism, we find it not so very meritorious; if the act is peculiar, we deny that it is entirely original.

The fact that a criminal has been brought up amid evil surroundings makes him, in our eyes, less guilty.

An act of self-devotion performed by a father or a mother, or inspired by hope of recompense, is easier to understand than a disinterested sacrifice, and, because of the motive, it seems to us less worthy of sympathy, inasmuch as it is not free.

The actions of the founder of a sect, of the head of a party, of an inventor, astonish us less the more clearly we understand how their activity has been developed.

If we are able to take into consideration a

long series of experiences, if our observations are directed in a way to discover the relation of cause and effect in human actions, the latter will seem to be less free than would have been the case if we had not been able to trace so surely each effect to its cause.

The more simple and the more numerous the acts under consideration, the more firmly do they seem to be bound to the law of necessity.

The bad action of a man whose father has led an irregular life, the evil conduct of a woman who has fallen in with corrupt associates, the return of a drunkard to his vice, — all these acts seem to us less free the better we know the causes that engendered them.

Finally, if the person of whose action we judge is at the lowest stage of intellectual development, a child, a maniac, an idiot, and if we know the motives of action and the lack of complexity in the character and mind of the one by whom the action is performed, we shall, under these circumstances, find so much sub-

jection to necessity and so little liberty that we can, when the conditions are specified, foretell what that person's conduct will be.

Upon these three relations alone are based the codes which provide for the plea of mental irresponsibility and the consideration of extenuating circumstances.

The irresponsibility is greater or less in proportion as we know more or less clearly the conditions under which the accused acted, in proportion to the longer or shorter lapse of time between the crime and the judgment passed upon it, and in proportion to the fulness of our knowledge regarding the causes by which the act was produced.

XIII.

THE CONDITIONS OF ACTION.

We may now sum up the views already advanced.

Our idea of liberty and necessity diminishes or increases in proportion to our knowledge of the relation of the event to the external world, according to whether the epoch when the event took place is more or less distant in the past, and according to the dependence of the event upon the causes that produced it.

When we examine the actions of a man who is seen to have been attached to the world about him by very intimate ties, whose deeds took place in a far distant period of time, and were produced by causes with which we are familiar, we invaribly conclude that his acts were controlled by an imperious law of necessity,

and that, consequently, they had no freedom whatever.

If, on the contrary, we consider the acts of a man who is as independent as he can be of external conditions, whose action has occurred within a recent period, and whose deeds are to us wholly unintelligible, we conclude that necessity had very little to do with the matter, and that there must have been a large degree of liberty.

But neither in the first nor in the second case, — whatever the point of view we occupy, whatever idea we may have of the man's relation to the external world, whether the causes of action are clear or unintelligible, whether the event occurred at a near or a remote period, — in neither case can we conceive of an act as absolutely predestined or as absolutely free.

1. We cannot possibly imagine man entirely removed from external influences; we cannot conceive of man possessing liberty in space.

Because of the nature of the human body

and of all its surroundings, the actions of man are inexorably conditioned.

I lift my hand and let it fall. The action seems to me to be free. But when I ask if I could have lifted my hand in any direction, I see that my gesture was made in the direction of least resistance from surrounding obstacles and from the organization of my own body.

If among all possible directions I chose one, it was because that particular direction offered the least resistance to my purpose.

If an act of mine is to be free, it must not encounter any obstacle.

To imagine a free man, I must imagine him in space, and I cannot reconcile the idea of human liberty with the idea of space.

2. In whatever way we examine an act that has just taken place, we cannot conceive of liberty in time. If I examine an act accomplished a second ago, I must recognize the fact that it was not free, since it was limited by the

space and time in which and during which it occurred.

I ask myself, "Can I raise my hand?" and I raise my hand.

Then I ask myself, "Could I have raised my hand in the moment that just went by?"

To convince myself that I could, I do not raise my hand in the moment that follows.

But I did not raise my hand at the moment when I asked myself if I were free to raise it. That moment no longer exists, and never will exist again; I was powerless to retain it. Moreover, the hand I would have raised then was not the same hand I raise now, and the air in which the movement would have taken place was not the same as the air by which my hand is now surrounded.

The moment in which I made the first movement is irretrievable, during that moment I could make but one movement, and whatever

that movement was it could not have been anything else.

The fact that I did not raise my hand the moment after, does not prove at all that I could not raise it the moment before.

As I could perform but one particular movement in the given space of time, it had to be that movement and no other.

If I am to regard myself as free, I must imagine myself to be in the present, in the past, and in the future, that is to say, independent of time — which is impossible.

3. Whatever difficulty we may have in getting at the causes of an act, we never can admit that the act was absolutely free; that is, without any cause.

We may not be able to discover the cause which led our will or the will of another man to such and such an act, but reason obliges us to assume that without a cause the event would not have taken place.

I raise my hand that I may perform an act

independent of any cause, but the very wish to accomplish an act without a cause is itself the cause of the act.

If we could imagine man independent of all external influences, if we considered only a momentary act, and regarded it as an act without a cause, if we reduced necessity to zero, — even then we should not obtain absolute liberty for man; for a being who was insensible to external influences, a being who existed outside of time, and who was not dependent on any cause, would simply not be human.

By the same course of reasoning we cannot imagine a man's actions to be entirely devoid of freedom, and wholly subject to necessity.

1. Our knowledge of the conditions under which man exists in space may go to the furthest possible limit and yet not be complete, for the number of conditions is infinite, as space is infinite.

Since we cannot know *all* the conditions, *all* the influences that act upon man, we cannot admit absolute necessity, we are obliged to recognize a certain degree of liberty.

2. We may select an event that took place at a very remote epoch from the moment when we form our judgment, and yet the intervening period will be limited, while time is infinite. Hence in this relation there cannot be absolute necessity.

3. We may know the succession of causes that have preceded an act, but we never can know every link in the chain ; it is infinite, and here again we cannot attain to the idea of absolute necessity.

But even if we reduce liberty to zero, if we could possibly find a case where liberty was wholly wanting, as for example, in a dying person, an idiot, or a fœtus, we should at the same time destroy our conception of manhood, for man without liberty is not man.

Thus the idea that man's acts are subject

exclusively to the law of necessity without the least degree of liberty, is as untenable as the other idea, that the acts of man are absolutely free.

XIV.

THE ESSENCE OF LIFE.

We have seen that in order to conceive of man's acts as subject exclusively to the law of necessity, we must have knowledge of an infinite number of conditions in space, of an infinite period of time, and of an infinite series of causes.

If we would have man absolutely free and independent of the law of necessity we must have him isolated from space, time, and causality.

If, in the first case, necessity without liberty were possible, we should be obliged to define the law of necessity by necessity itself; that is to say, we should have a form without content.

In the second place, we should have liberty outside of space, time, and causality, which would be a content without form.

We thus reach the two fundamental principles upon which man forms his conception of the world; we have attained to the impenetrable essence of life, and to the laws which determine that essence of life.

From reason we learn the three following propositions: —

1. Space, and all the forms that matter gives to space are infinite, and cannot be conceived of otherwise.

2. Time is an infinite, unresting progress, and cannot be conceived in any other way.

3. The chain of cause and effect has no beginning, and it never can have an end.

From consciousness, man derives these three conclusions: —

1. I alone exist; all that exists is in me; I contain space.

2. I measure time by the immutable present moment in which I live, and I am therefore outside of time.

3. I am independent of causality, for I feel

that I am the cause of all the manifestations of my life.

Reason expresses the law of necessity.

Consciousness declares the essence of free will.

Liberty without limit is the essence of life in the consciousness of man.

Necessity without content is the reason of man in three forms.

Liberty is the observed: necessity is the observer.

Liberty is the content: necessity is the form.

When we separate the two sources of knowledge which are related to one another as form and content, we conceive the idea of liberty and the idea of necessity, which mutually exclude one another and are incomprehensible.

But if we put these two ideas side by side, we obtain a very definite conception of the life of man.

The relation which exists between liberty and necessity, that is to say, the relation

which unites consciousness to the laws of reason, comprises all we know of the life of man.

The relation which exists between natural forces and the law of necessity, that is to say, the relation which exists between the essence of life and the laws of reason, comprises all we know of the physical world.

The forces of nature are outside of us and are inconceivable — we call them gravitation, inertia, electricity, animal strength, etc.; but we *can* conceive of the force of human life, and we call it liberty.

The essence of the law of gravitation escapes us, but we know its effects; it is intelligible only when we recognize the law of necessity (our notions about weight were very crude before Newton's law was formulated). In the same way the force of liberty is incomprehensible in itself, but we know that it exists; we understand it only when we recognize the law of necessity to which it is sub-

ject, and we may apply it in the first place to the fact that every man is destined to die in accordance with the most complex economical and historical laws.

To know, is to bring the essence of life in subjection to the laws of reason.

Man distinguishes his liberty from other forces by his consciousness, but in the light of reason, liberty is classed with other forces.

The forces of gravitation, electricity, chemical affinity, are distinguished from one another only by means of qualities determined by reason.

So the force of liberty in man is distinguished from other natural forces only by the definition which reason gives.

Liberty separated from necessity, that is, brought under the laws of a determining reason, cannot be distinguished from gravitation, or heat, or vegetable growth, — to reason, liberty is simply a momentary and indefinite sensation of life.

Now, as the indeterminate essence of the force that moves the heavenly bodies is the subject of astronomy, as the essences of the forces of heat, electricity, chemical affinity, and nutrition are the subjects of physics, chemistry, botany, and zoölogy, so the essence of the force of liberty is the subject of history.

But while science studies only the manifestations of the unknown essence of life, metaphysics is concerned only with the essence of life. History, therefore, has for its object the manifestations of liberty in man, while liberty itself is a subject for metaphysical speculation.

In those sciences which are devoted to the study of living things, we classify all that is known under the law of necessity; what we are unable to understand goes by the name of vital force.

Vital force is what remains obscure in our knowledge of the essence of life.

So in history, what we know we call necessity; what we do not know, we conceal under the name of liberty!

To history, liberty is what we do not know about the life of humanity.

XV.

THE SEARCH FOR CAUSES.

History studies the manifestations of human liberty in their relations with the external world, with time, and with causality, that is to say, it seeks to determine liberty in accordance with the laws of reason, and so history deserves the name of science only in so far as it determines liberty by means of these laws.

It is just as impossible for history to regard human liberty as a force exercising an influence upon events in the life of men (that is, as a force not subject to law), as it is for astronomy to recognize liberty of movement in the heavenly bodies.

If we admit absolute liberty, we destroy the possibility of law and of science.

If a single heavenly body were endowed with freedom of movement, the laws of Kepler and

Newton would be vain, and we could not form any idea with regard to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

If a single human action were free, there would be no historical laws, and we could not form any accurate idea of historical events.

History is concerned only with lines of movement or will; these lines, on the one hand, disappear in the infinite; on the other hand, they appear as consciousness of liberty in the present, they are situated in space, time, and causality, and they are under the dominion of reason.

The larger the field of movement, the clearer do the laws of movement become.

The object of history is to grasp and define the laws of human movement.

If historical science looks at the object of its investigations from its actual point of view and seeks the causes of events in the free will of men, it cannot possibly formulate laws, for, if we once admit the existence of a force not sub-

ject to law, there can be no law, and human liberty cannot be limited.

Only when we reduce will to an infinitesimal, do we believe causes to be inaccessible, and only then does history give up the search for causes, and, instead, endeavor to determine laws.

Other sciences have sought for these laws by following new and constantly developing methods, while historical science goes on with its destructive differentiation of causes.

The mathematics, the most exact of all sciences, having reached the infinitely small, abandons the process of differentiation and makes use of a new process, that of infinitesimal integration.

Thus the mathematics gives up the search for causes, and seeks for laws which are the qualities of unknown infinitesimals.

In one way or another, the other sciences have adopted the same method.

When Newton formulated the law of gravita-

tion, he did not say that the sun and the earth attracted one another ; he said that all bodies, from the largest to the smallest, possessed the property of mutual attraction.

Newton put aside the question of the cause of the movement of bodies, and simply announced a quality peculiar to all bodies, from the infinitely great to the infinitely small.

The natural sciences put aside the question of causation and seek only for laws.

Will history follow the method adopted by all the other sciences ?

If history is to be in reality a science of the movements of peoples and of humanity, and not a description of episodes in the lives of a few men, it must put aside the idea of causation, and occupy itself with the laws common to all the closely united infinitesimal elements of liberty.

XVI.

CONCLUSION.

When Copernicus discovered the simple fact that the sun did not move around the earth, but that the earth moved around the sun, he reversed the entire cosmography of the ancients.

It was possible, by rejecting the Copernican idea, to retain the old theory of the movements of the heavenly bodies, but, without rejecting it, study of celestial phenomena from the Ptolemaic point of view was out of the question.

And yet for a long time after Copernicus announced his discovery, men continued their adherence to the Ptolemaic cosmography.

Now that it has been declared and proved that the numbers of births and deaths are sub-

ject to mathematical laws, that the government of a country depends upon certain economical, political, and geographical conditions, now that certain relations between populations and the countries they inhabit are found to result in the transmigration of peoples, — now that these facts are demonstrated, the fundamental principles of the old historical science are destroyed.

We may reject these new laws, and hold to the time-worn idea with regard to the object of history, but unless we do reject them we cannot continue to consider historical events as the results of the free will of man.

For if governments have been established or movements incited because of certain geographical, ethnographical, or economical conditions, the will of the men who have heretofore been regarded as the founders of governments and leaders of movements, can no longer be considered as the cause of historical events.

And yet ancient history is still studied in

conjunction with statistics, geography, political economy, comparative philology, and geology, all of which propound laws in absolute contradiction with historical principles.

In natural philosophy, the struggle between the old and the new theory was long and obstinate.

Theology was the guardian of the old idea, and it accused the new school of shattering the bulwarks of revelation. But when science triumphed, theology utilized the new foundation, and was as well off as before.

History is to-day going through with the same struggle; once more, theology makes all possible effort to hold on to the old idea, and once more it accuses the innovators of upsetting revelation.

As in the former instance, the struggle excites the passions of both parties, and obscures the truth.

One party is afraid that the work of centuries will be destroyed, and the other party

desires, in the ardor of battle, to sweep away everything.

The men who have fought against the truths of natural philosophy believed that if they acknowledged these truths, faith in God, in the creation, in Joshua's miracle, would be utterly overthrown.

The defenders of the laws of Copernicus and Newton, — Voltaire, for example — were persuaded that the laws of astronomy, aided by the law of gravitation, would put an end to religion.

So, to-day, people assert that if we acknowledge the law of necessity, our ideas about the soul, about good and evil, and with them all the political and religious institutions depending on these ideas, will be annihilated.

Like Voltaire, the defenders of the law of necessity make use of this law as a weapon against religion ; but the truth is, that the law of necessity in history, like the Copernican law in astronomy, will strengthen rather than

destroy the foundations upon which our political and religious institutions rest.

In history to-day, as formerly in astronomy, the point of difference is simply a denial or an affirmation of an absolute unity for the measurement of observed phenomena.

To astronomy this unity was the immobility of the earth ; to history, it is the independence or liberty of man.

Just as astronomy found it difficult to renounce its belief in the immobility of the earth and the motions of the stars, so history finds it difficult to renounce the idea of personal independence, and to acknowledge that man is subject to the laws of space, time, and causality.

The conclusion reached by astronomy was, —

"It is true that we are not sensible of the motion of the earth, but if we believe in its immobility we arrive at an absurdity, while if we acknowledge the existence of a motion we cannot discern, we are able to formulate laws."

The new historical school makes this declaration, —

"It is true that we do not realize our dependence, but if we believe in liberty we convict ourselves of an absurdity, while if we acknowledge our dependence upon the external world of time and cause, we are able to establish laws."

In the first instance, it was necessary to renounce the idea of immobility in space, which was apparent, and to acknowledge the existence of a motion that was imperceptible.

In the second instance, we must give up the idea of a liberty of which we seem to be conscious, and substitute for it a dependence that we do not feel.

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